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Abstract
As information systems managers come under increasing pressure to
improve the cost performance of information processing, outsourcing has become
an important management strategy. Although information systems outsourcing is
now a major industry, it is still a new decision problem for many managers. As
managers gain more and more experience with IS outsourcing, satisfaction with
vendor performance is becoming a major issue. Key to managing outsourcing
relationships is the outsourcing contract. These contracts assign responsibilities and
rewards for the parties. However, improperly or incompletely written contracts have
lead to adverse problems. How then are managers to choose from a set of options
that which is most appropriate for their firm? Outsourcing problems are complex and
Journal of the Association for Information Systems

1

entail considerable implications for the strategy of the firm. Although many articles
have appeared on outsourcing, few have extended the discussion beyond simple
cost-benefit analysis. Contracts that encourage vendor performance and discourage
under-performance are clearly of interest to managers. In this paper, an approach
to analyzing incentive schemes and structuring outsourcing contracts for the mutual
gain of the parties is presented. The approach provides managers with a strategy
and techniques for analyzing some of the more subtle issues they may face when
dealing with complex outsourcing decision problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last several years, information systems outsourcing has emerged
as a major issue for IS managers. The primary motivation for outsourcing portions
of the IS portfolio is the perceived potential for cost savings by the outsourcer. It is
claimed that IS outsourcing vendors can achieve economies of scale and
specialization because their only business is information processing. IS outsourcing
vendors can purchase equipment at a lower cost and allocate fixed cost more
favorably. The potential for cost savings has lead many senior managers to enter
into various types of contracts with IS outsourcing vendors. However, while some
firms have achieved their cost reduction goals by outsourcing, others have had
various degrees of failure (Due 1992; Lacity and Hirschheim 1993a, 1993b;
Rochester and Douglas 1990, 1993). Many firms have had to prematurely terminate
contracts and re-established their data centers (Lacity and Hirschheim 1993a,
1993b; Reponen 1993). Others have had to seek out new vendors and write new
contracts. Although the price of entry into IS outsourcing can be low relative to inhouse cost, it can rise steeply after the outsourcer is “locked-in.” A recent empirical
study (Lacity and Willcocks 1995) found that in 53 out of 61 outsourcing cases,
managers reported an unsatisfactory outcome. One explanation for some of the
failures is the complexity of IS outsourcing transactions (Lacity and Hirschheim
1993a; Loh and Venkatraman 1992). Another explanation that has been given for
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IS outsourcing failures is the limited selection of decision models and tools to help
managers systematically analyze outsourcing decisions (Alpar and Saharia 1995;
Chaundry et al. 19921; Ngwenyama and Bryson 1999; Reponen1993). Another
recent survey (Ward et al. 1996) found that nearly 75% of IS managers believed that
their analysis and planning methods failed to adequately quantify relevant benefits
from specific investments in IT. As Ngwenyama and Bryson point out, IS
outsourcing management and decisions are complex, involving many factors, such
as (1) selecting one or more reliable outsourcing vendor, (2) entering and managing
a long term relationship with one or more outsourcing vendor, (3) exposing vital
organization assets to the control of external agents, (4) coordinating between
internal users and outsourcing vendors, (5) monitoring vendors and inducing them
to deliver on performance requirements, and (6) defining viable backup and recovery
options. This paper responds to a gap in the management literature that has not
systematically addressed these issues until now. We propose an approach and
some decision analysis techniques for analyzing incentive schemes and structuring
outsourcing contracts that are mutually beneficial to the outsourcer and vendor. In
the following sections, we present the basic concepts of our model, which is based
on transaction cost theory, and illustrate its use with an example. Our approach
seeks to help senior managers in answering the following questions:
(1)

What are the risks and benefits of different outsourcing incentive schemes?

(2)

What is the potential vulnerability to the firm if the vendor under-performs on
the contracted activity?

(3)

How can the firm protect itself from opportunistic bargaining by its vendor(s)?

(4)

How should incentive schemes be structured to ensure reliable vendor
performance?

1

Although Chaundry et al. labeled IS outsourcing a mixed integer programming problem, they
provide no model or analysis.
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II. OUTSOURCING STRATEGIES AND CONTRACTS
In the general literature on outsourcing, two basic strategies—single vendor
and multiple vendor—have been suggested.

However, in their econometric

analysis, Ngwenyama and Bryson (1999) pointed out that setup and coordination
costs inhibit IS managers from adopting the multiple vendor strategy. Empirical
studies also support this analysis; the most common form of IS outsourcing is the
single vendor approach (Rochester and Douglas 1990). We will, however, give a
brief review of the arguments (for a detailed analysis of economic implications of
single and multiple vendor strategies see, Ngwenyama and Bryson).
The multiple vendor strategy can be traced to Porter’s (1985) recommendation on using several competing vendors to insure low cost, high performance,
and quality. Porter suggests that an outsourcer can increase his bargaining power
by contracting with a number of vendors who are in competition with each other. The
argument posits that the ever present threat of losing business to one another will
induce each vendor to provide a higher level of performance and quality than it
otherwise would. In the single vendor outsourcing strategy, the outsourcer develops
a strong relationship with one vendor. Although the single vendor strategy leaves
a firm open to opportunistic bargaining and performance failure vulnerability, some
have argued that it can be effective in some situations. Deming (1986) suggests that
developing a highly integrated long-term relationship with a single vendor can
considerably reduce cost and improve quality. According to Deming, poor vendor
performance is the result of poor communication and coordination. He argues that
it is more costly to monitor and coordinate the activities of multiple vendors than for
a single vendor. Consequently, single vendor outsourcing minimizes performance
assurance costs and, therefore, total cost.
Contracts are an important part of the analysis of outsourcing decisions. They
can provide effective mechanisms for managing the outsourcing relationship and
early termination provisions in cases of under-performance. Generally, there are two
classes of outsourcing contracts: fixed fee and incentive. In a simple fixed fee
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contract, the payment to the vendor is fixed but the vendor can negotiate additional
payments for variations. Under the fixed fee contract (FFC), the vendor is
responsible for all of the risk of cost overruns, but if efficiency can be improved, a
higher profit can be made. In practice, however, when there are cost overruns the
vendor can engage in opportunistic bargaining. That is, the client can be pressured
to pay the overruns if the client is outsourcing to a single vendor and there is no
credible option of switching. A second type of fixed fee arrangement is the cost plus
contract (CPC), which involves the risk of cost overruns that would be borne solely
by the client. The second type of contract, incentive contracts, attempts to share the
risks and rewards between the client and the vendor. Generally, these contracts
specify an expected level of service and penalties for under-performance and
incentives for various levels of performance. Penalties and incentives are important
features of any type of IS outsourcing contract; they serve as inducements to the
vendor and as mechanisms by which the outsourcer can manage shirking in the
relationship. There are two main types of incentive contracts: fixed price incentive
contracts (FPIC) and variable price incentive contracts (VPIC). These two types of
contracts differ in how they treat vendor under-performance and cost overruns.
Later in this paper, we will show how the manager can analyze and structure
incentive schemes for these two types of contracts.
III. BASICS CONCEPTS OF OUTSOURCING
Contracting out information processing activities entails significant loss of
control over the performance of the activities. Associated with this loss of control
are two basic risks: shirking and opportunistic bargaining. Shirking refers to the
vendor’s under-performance on the contracted activities; opportunistic bargaining
refers to a vendor’s ability to demand higher than market prices. An outsourcer can
be subjected to opportunistic bargaining when “locked-in” to a single vendor and
considerable costs would be incurred by switching to another vendor (Ngwenyama
and Bryson 1999). To minimize the risks of shirking, the outsourcer can invest in
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monitoring and coordinating mechanisms. Often, an outsourcer sets up an organizational unit to coordinate the interactions between its end-users and the vendor and
to monitor the vendor’s performance.2 Depending on the size and complexity of the
outsourced activities, this unit can be quite large and costly. On the other hand,
minimizing the risk of opportunistic bargaining is a more complicated issue. For
example, Porter (1985) has suggested that the ever present threat of losing
business to multiple competing vendors will induce the vendors to deliver acceptable
performance and bargain fairly with the outsourcer. However, as Ngwenyama and
Bryson have shown, outsourcing information processing activities to multiple
vendors is infeasible in all but a few cases, because the total cost of outsourcing to
multiple vendors exceeds the return. Further, information systems outsourcing is an
indefinite horizon game. Given these conditions, it is common practice for firms to
outsource their information processing to a single vendor. The question for the
manager, then, is how to analyze and manage the risks of outsourcing to a single
vendor.
In single vendor outsourcing, if there are no costs for switching vendors (or
insourcing3), the outsourcer can induce the vendor to provide the agreed upon level
of service because there is a credible threat of losing the contract. However, if the
outsourcer has made specific investments in the single vendor or cannot switch to
another vendor (or insource due to lack of capacity) without further outlay, the
credible threat of losing business is diminished and the vendor has room to
determine the level of performance it will provide. If the outsourcer’s switching cost
exceeds the vendor’s cost of providing low performance, the vendor can provide low
performance and increase his profits without fear of losing the contract. Thus, the
vendor can shirk to a degree determined by the outsourcer’s switching cost. The

2

The outsourcer must monitor several aspects of vendor performance: MTBF of systems,
systems response time, vendor interactions with end-users, and so on.
3

The insourcing case assumes that the outsourcer has the capacity to provide the information
processing in house.

Journal of the Association for Information Systems

6

outsourcer might decide to invest in higher levels of monitoring and coordinating to
minimize vendor shirking. But the outsourcer must take into account the vendor’s
choice of level of performance (Ngwenyama and Bryson 1999).
DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
Several issues must be examined when analyzing incentive schemes, but the
primary objective of managers making IS outsourcing decisions is to minimize total
cost and maximize total value to the firm. Two important questions are:
(1)

What are the ranges of costs and values of various levels of vendor
performance?

(2)

How can they be measured and analyzed?

The cost of outsourcing a set of information processing activities is relatively easy
to define; the difficulty lies in defining the costs and values of different levels of
performance. This is because the techniques for defining the value of information
are not well developed, much work is still needed to provide foundational concepts
and methods of analysis (Ahituv 1980; Alpar and Kim 1990; Clemons 1991; Feltham
1968; Hitt and Brynjolfsson 1994). In the remainder of this section of the paper, we
attempt to make some headway on this difficult issue. We outline two approaches:
the first for defining the value of information processing activities and the second for
defining the value of various levels of vendor performance. For the purpose of our
analysis, we make the following assumptions:
(1)

The interactions between the outsourcer and vendor are an indefinite horizon
game.

(2)

An incentive contract that specifies the price to be paid (in installments), the
period, service and expected level of performance is agreed upon by the
parties.

(3)

The vendor provides the service at a certain level of performance.
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(4)

The outsourcer monitors the performance and determines the final payment
to be made to the vendor and whether to renew the contract or switch to
another vendor.

In considering the level of performance to provide, the vendor must weigh the
possibility of losing a profit and the contract for the remainder of the game. We also
assume that both parties have relevant information and knowledge of each other’s
objective function and costs and that each period in the indefinite horizon is
identical. In the next section, we outline a model for analyzing outsourcing incentive
schemes.
Defining the Business Value of Outsourcing
Since a primary objective of the outsourcer is to maximize return on information processing, it is important to understand the various components of the value
function. Although there are no standard models for this analysis, the attributes
information cost and information quality are widely accepted as key components of
the value function (Ahituv 1980; Ballou and Pazer 1995; Feltham 1968; Kriebel
1979; Redman 1992; Salmela 1997). Each of these attributes is composed of many
components. Figure 1 graphically depicts the main components of the outsourcer’s
value function. Information cost concerns the cost of acquiring, processing, and
using the information, while information quality is concerned with such issues as
accuracy, reliability, completeness, relevance, consistency, and contextuality. Both
information cost and quality are important attributes in determining the business
value of investments in IS outsourcing. One objective of the IS manager is to
continually improve the quality and reliability of the information that is provided to
end-users. This can be done by making information more accurate, reliable,
complete, precise, current, and easy to access and understand. By improving the
quality of information the IS manager can improve business value by reducing the
cost of operating the business.
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Savings on Information Cost
Information Processing
Cost
IT Infrastructure Cost

Savings on Information Quality

Business Benefits
Savings on Business
Operations

Business Value of IS
Outsourcing

Improved
competitiveness and
management

Accuracy, reliability, etc.

Timeliness, ease of
access

Figure 1. Components of the IS Outsourcing Value Function
Timely, accurate, and relevant information can result in improved management and competitiveness (Porter and Miller 1985). For example, accurate information about inventory or production capacity can help a firm reduce capital invested
in inventory and improve production planning. Furthermore, information quality and
reliability can be improved to better manage relationships with customers and
suppliers. Timeliness and ease of access to information also reduce the cost of
conducting business activities. For example, badly designed user interfaces and
difficult navigation paths around the information systems can lead to user frustration
and mistakes in interpreting information. Together, improvements in information
quality, reliability, timeliness, and ease of access can contribute to savings in
business operations, improve management decision making and competitiveness
(King et al. 1989; McFarlan 1984; Porter and Miller 1985; Sethi et al. 1993;
Simmons 1996).
Information processing cost includes capital investments in infrastructure,
overhead, user time, and IS personnel time. Information processing requires a complex infrastructure of computers, data storage devices, communication networks,

Journal of the Association for Information Systems

9

office space, and so on. All of these require large capital investments. Another
component of information processing costs is IT personnel. Information processing
departments require a wide variety of technical specialists to build, implement, and
maintain information systems. Further, the labor cost of IT professionals has risen
over the past 10 years due to market conditions (Gallivan 1997). A third component
is the hidden costs of using information systems. According to Heikkila (1995), one
of the most important costs of business operations is the time that users spend
searching for and interpreting information for decision making. Poor user interface
design, inefficient use processes, and the need to rely on manual backup systems
increase the time users need to perform their information processing tasks and
organizational decision making activities. Therefore, if the outsourcer can lower the
unit cost of information processing and improve quality and reliability of the
information, the greater the business value obtained. In general, the primary
objectives of the IS manager considering outsourcing are to:
•

reduce the labor cost of IS personnel,

•

reduce user cost,

•

reduce cost of IS infrastructure and capital investments, and

•

improve information quality and reliability.

BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE MODEL
The total cost of IS outsourcing can be broken down into
(1)

The cost of the information processing service, which can be estimated from
the market.

(2)

Set-up/contracting cost, which includes search related cost to find a vendor,
negotiation fees, legal fees, and other labor charges incurred to institutionalize the relationship.

Journal of the Association for Information Systems

10

(3)

The cost of monitoring and coordinating the activities of the vendor(s), which
includes labor and equipment.4

(4)

Switching cost, the cost to change vendors in situations of underperformance or failure.

Let us assume that the contract under consideration is based on q units to be
processed and that all contract periods are identical in a multi-period scenario. We
present the analysis in two stages. In the first stage, we determine both the outsourcer’s and the vendor’s maximum possible profits when a fixed set of coordinating and monitoring strategies are utilized. Given that this is a single vendor
situation and the outsourcer’s threat to switch vendors is diminished, the vendor’s
maximum profit is computed with the assumption that shirking will take place. In the
second stage of the analysis, we determine the outsourcer's expected profit5 given
the probability that the vendor will shirk. We then estimate the probability of the
vendor shirking on a specified performance requirement given the price of the
contract and the coordination strategy of the outsourcer. Next we outline an
algorithm for computing the highest profit the outsourcer can expect to achieve
under the single vendor strategy of outsourcing. We provide an example to illustrate
the analysis. The following is the formal description of the model:
Definition of Terms
•

A is the set of coordination strategies that the outsourcer is
considering with the vendor;

•

g (a) is the coordination cost to the outsourcer if coordination strategy
a  A is used.

4

This also includes the cost to set up and run an organizational unit to monitor and coordinate
the interactions between the outsourcer and the vendor as described earlier.
5

Although cost savings is the term of common usage, transaction cost theory uses the general
term profit to describe the gains obtained by entering into a specific transaction.
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•

E is the set of monitoring strategies that the outsourcer could use with
the vendor;

•

f (e) is the cost to the outsourcer if monitoring strategy e  E is used.

•

s is the outsourcer’s setup costs.

•

 is a measure of the quality of the vendor's performance;

•

vo (σ
σ) is a measure of the value to the outsourcer if the vendor’s
performance is ;

•

cD (, a) is the vendor’s cost to maintain a performance of  under
coordination strategy a;

•

p (a, e) is the price that the outsourcer pays the vendor under
coordination strategy a and monitoring strategy e.

•

D is the minimum profit rate acceptable to the vendor.

•

D is the relative increase in the vendor’s profit.

•

 O ( , a, e, p) is the outsourcer’s profit if the vendor’s performance

is  and price is p.
•

 D ( , a, e, p) is the vendor’s profit when his performance is  and

price is p.
Assumptions
For a given coordination strategy a, vo (), and cD (, a) are step functions
such that:
 1:

vo (σ)

=

vk

  [ k,  k+1), k = 1, 2, ..., K.

cD (, a)

=

ck

  [ k,  k+1), k = 1, 2, ..., K

where vk > vk+1 and for a given coordination strategy a the values vk and ck(a) are
known constants.
Let us also assume that a (coordinating costs) and e (monitoring costs) are
fixed. We will, therefore, temporarily drop our references to these variables. Thus
the outsourcer’s and vendor’s profits are defined by the following relationships:
Journal of the Association for Information Systems
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 2:

 o (, p) = vo () - p - g - f - s.
 D (, p) = p - cD ()

Computing Outsourcer’s Maximum Profit
In the single vendor situation, we need to take into account the objectives of
both outsourcer and vendor. If there are no costs to switch vendors, the outsourcer
can induce the vendor to provide a specified level of performance. However, the
vendor can refuse or renege on the contract if it is unprofitable. Thus the maximum
profit that the outsourcer can realize is subject to the vendor realizing his minimum
acceptable profit rate  D. The outsourcer’s maximum profit can be computed as:
 3:

 o ( o, po ) =

Max  o (, p) = vo () - p - g - f - s.

s.t.  o (, p) = p - cD () >  Dp.
This may be expressed as the following mixed integer programming problem:
 4:

 o( o, po)

=

Max  k vk yk - p - g - f - s
p -  k ck(a)yk > Dp

s.t.

 k yk = 1

yk  { 0, 1}
where D is a fixed constant; and p and the yk’s are the variables.
The solution to this problem will provide the optimum price po that the
outsourcer should pay the vendor and the corresponding maximum profit (, a,
e, p) and performance level  o that the outsourcer will receive. Let vo and co be the
value and cost associated with the optimal solution of this problem. Then given that
g, f, and s are fixed, it follows that:
 5:

(vo - po)

=

Max { (vk - po) : k = 1, 2, ..., K)

where po > co/ (1- D). It follows that po = co/ (1- D ), and so
(vo - po) = Max { (vk - ck(a)/ (1 -  D) : k = 1, 2, ... , K).
Thus it is not necessary to explicitly solve the mixed integer programming problem.
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Computing Vendor's Maximum Profit
If the outsourcer has made specific investments (set-up costs) in a single
vendor relationship and faces switching cost, the vendor is free to provide a level of
performance that maximizes profits without fear that the outsourcer will switch. Now
if the price is fixed at the outsourcer’s optimum po, then given the setup cost s, the
optimal profit that the vendor can realize without causing the outsourcer to switch
to another vendor is given by the solution of the following problem:
 6:

 D ( D, po) = Max (, po) = po - cD ()

s.t.

 o ( o, po) -  o(, po) < s.

This may be expressed as the following mixed integer programming problem:
7:

D( D, po)

s.t.

=

Max po -  k ck(a)yk

vo -  k vk yk < s
 yk = 1

yk  { 0, 1}
It should be noted that the optimal solution for this problem is associated with
the index D where cD = Min {ck : vo - vk < s; k > 0}. Thus (vo - vD) is the potential
shirking cost if the outsourcer pays the vendor po but the vendor performs at level
σ D. The vendor’s profit in this case is  D ( D, po), = (po - cD), the increase being
(co - cD).
Computing Outsourcer’s Expected Profit
In the single vendor situation, the presence of switching costs allows the
vendor some degree of shirking. The total cost to the outsourcer includes set-up
costs, shirking costs, and expenditures for monitoring and coordination. Therefore,
the outsourcer’s profit is affected to the degree that the vendor is able to determine
level of performance. Thus, in seeking to maximize the outsourcer’s expected profit
we must take into account the vendor’s choice. The outsourcer’s expected profit
under shirking can be modeled and analyzed as follows: let ho be the probability
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that the vendor will shirk given the contract requirement for performance level σ o
and price po and coordination strategy a. The outsourcer’s expected profit may thus
be expressed as:
8:

E[ o( o, po)] = (1 - ho)  o ( o, po) + ho  o ( D ,po)
E[ o( o, po)] =  o ( o, po) - ho (vo - vD)

Definition
A coordination strategy ai2 is superior to ai1 iff:
Max E[o(k, pk, ai2)] > Max E[o(k, pk, ai1)]
Remark 1
If (co - cD) < ho (vo - vD), then an incentive policy that pays the vendor (co - cD)
if the performance level is o is superior to a policy that is based on taking the risk
that the vendor will not shirk.
Analyzing Incentive Schemes
So far, our discussion has assumed that vendor shirking is possible and
likely. We now turn our attention to an analysis of the incentive schemes and
contracts that can make shirking unattractive to the vendor. Our approach to
structuring these incentive contracts involves specifying penalty and reward
components. The vendor is penalized for performing below the agreed-upon
performance level and is rewarded for performing at or above the agreed upon
performance level. Below we describe two such incentive contracts, fixed price
(FPIC) and variable price (VPIC).
Preliminary Assumptions
Let D be the minimum profit rate acceptable to the vendor and let  T be the
minimum profit rate acceptable to the outsourcer. Given setup costs s, then
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associated with each performance level k is an associated vendor shirking level kd
such that kd = Max {kr: vk - vkr < s; k < kr}.
Case 1: Fixed Price Incentive Contracts
If in a fixed price contract the cost ck for performing at level k is constant, but
the vendor actually performs at level kd, then in the absence of any penalty the
vendor increases his profit by (ck - ckd). This under-performance results in a
corresponding decrease in outsourcer’s profit by (vk - vkd). If the vendor was paid pk
= ck/(1 - D) for performing at level k, then the relative increase in the vendor’s profit
is  = (1 - D)(ck - ckd)/pk = (ck - ckd)/ck. In such a situation, the outsourcer can follow
one of two incentive schemes to induce the vendor to perform as agreed in the
contract. This approach requires that the outsourcer conduct a performance audit.
In each of these incentive schemes, we define a penalty component and an
incentive component to ensure that there is a cost to the vendor for underperforming and a profit motive for performing to the contract.
Incentive Scheme 1:
The Penalty Component
If the post-contract audit exposes that the vendor actually performed at level
kd, then the vendor would pay the outsourcer the amount of (vk - vkd). This incentive
scheme involves a carrot and stick approach.
Incentive Component
Let τNO, τYES (such that 0 < τNO < τYES) be threshold parameters such that the
vendor will definitely shirk if  > τYES, will definitely not shirk if  < τNO, and may or
may not shirk if τNO <  < τYES. Given that the outsourcer desires that the
performance level be k, an incentive contract would involve paying the vendor pk for
performing at level k. If  > τYES, then the vendor would be paid an additional
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incentive amount of (ck - ckd) if the post-contract audit confirms that the vendor
performs at level k. If condition τNO <  < τYES holds, then the vendor would be paid
an additional incentive amount of (ck - ckd)/(τYES - τNO) if the post-contract audit
confirms that the vendor performs at level k.
Incentive Scheme 2
Penalty Component of Incentive Contract
If the contract requires the vendor to perform at level k, then a penalty of (vk vkd) is charged to the vendor if performance is below level k. This amount would
partially compensate the outsourcer for the decrease in his profit that would result
from shirking.
Reward Component of Incentive Contract
If the contract requires the vendor to perform at level k, then payment to the
vendor is in two portions: pkA, which occurs before completion of the contract, and
pkB, which occurs after a performance level audit has been done on completion of
the contract. Here pkA = Max {ckE, pkd} and pkB = (pk - pkA)(1+r) if the vendor actually
performs at level k and pkB = 0 if the vendor does not actually perform at level k. The
initial amount pkA is chosen to be the maximum of the actual project cost and the
payment that the vendor would receive for performing at the corresponding shirking
level kd. The amount (pk - pkA)(1+r) represents the future value of the amount (pk pkA), where 100% is the relevant risk-free interest rate. This amounts to placing the
sum (pk - pkA) in an escrow account at the beginning of the contract.
Observation
The expected profit of Incentive Scheme 1 to the outsourcer is never greater
than the expected profit of Incentive Scheme 2.
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Justification
If the vendor shirks under Incentive Scheme 1, the outsourcer would have
paid the entire amount pk = ckE/(1 - D), while under Incentive Scheme 2 the
outsourcer would have paid the amount pkA = Max {ckE, pkd} < pk. In both cases, the
penalty to the vendor is the same.
If the vendor does not shirk then under Incentive Scheme 1, the outsourcer
pays no less than pk = ckE/(1 - D), while under Incentive Scheme 2 the outsourcer
pays exactly pk.
Case 2: Variable Price Incentive Contracts
In this case, although the vendor will still attempt to perform at the lowest
possible cost for a given performance level, there is still uncertainty about the actual
project cost. Let ck, the cost associated with level k, be a random variable that
follows a triangular distribution with parameters ckL, ckM, ckU such that Min(ck) = ckL
< ckM < ckU. = Max(ck) and ckM is associated with the highest point on the probability
density function of ck. Let ckE be the expected value of ck, then ckE = (ckL + ckM +
ckU)/3. If ckL = ckU, then ck is a constant. We assume that (vk - vk+1) > (ckE - c(k+1)E)
for relevant k, although it is possible that (vk - vk+1) < (ckU - c(k+1)L).
Since we assume that for each performance level, cost follows a triangular
distribution with parameters ckL, ckM, ckU then the relevant probability density
functions tk(ck) and probability functions Tk(ck) are defined as follows:
tk(ck) = 2(ck - ckL)/(ckM - ckL)(ckU - ckL)

if

ckL < ck < ckM

tk(ck) = 2(ckU - ck)/(ckU - ckM)(ckU - ckL)

if

ckM < ck < ckU

if

ckL < ck < ckM

Tk(ck) = 1 - (ckU - ck)2/(ckU - ckM)(ckU - ckL) if

ckM < ck < ckU

2

Tk(ck) = (ck - ckL) /(ckM - ckL)(ckU - ckL)

For our contract, we will initially assume that the vendor will be paid the
amount of pk = ckE/(1 -  in order to perform at level k. In this case, the vendor will
make a profit if (pk - ck) > 0, although there is uncertainty about the value of ck. Thus
there is no guarantee that the vendor will actually have a profit. Now while a penalty
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cost may force the vendor to perform at the agreed-upon level if the contract is
accepted, a penalty cost cannot induce the vendor to accept certain contractual
terms. The vendor, like the outsourcer, is motivated by profit; thus, if the penalty is
certain, the likelihood of profit should be viewed by the vendor as being relatively
high.
Penalty Component of Incentive Contract
In the event of cost uncertainty, can a contract force the vendor to perform
at the contracted performance level? One notes that even if the vendor was
charged a penalty of (vk - vkd) if the vendor fails to perform at level k, it may still be
possible that (ck - ckd) > (vk - vkd), and so the vendor could still earn a profit after
paying the penalty. Thus a risk-taking vendor might still shirk if Prob[(ck - ckd) > (vk vkd)] > 0. Given that ck  [ckL , ckU] and ckd  [ckdL , ckdU], it follows that (ck - ckd) < (ckU ckdL). Thus Prob[(ck - ckd) > (ckU - ckdL)] = 0. The penalty amount that would make
shirking unattractive to the vendor while still meeting any decrease in outsourcer
profit were the vendor to shirk anyway is Max {(vk - vkd), (ckU - ckdL)}.
Reward Component of Incentive Contract
Despite the uncertainty in costs, the vendor would still like to have a good
profit. While it may not be in the best interest of the outsourcer to guarantee the
vendor a profit for every possible cost, the outsourcer should be able to offer the
vendor a reasonably high probability of profit. Let γ be the minimum probability that
the vendor might find acceptable. Then we would require that Prob[ck < pk = ckE/(1 D)] > . If is fixed, then the value of D that would guarantee this probability could

be derived using the probability distribution function Tk(ck).
Prob[ck < pk = ckE/(1 -  D)] = T(ckE/(1 - D))
Prob[ck < pk = ckE/(1 - D)] = 1 - (ckU - ckE /(1 - D))2/(ckU - ckM)(ckU - ckL) > γ
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Alternatively, one could determine the corresponding probability of the vendor
making a profit that corresponds to various values of D. Obviously this probability
increases as D increases, but it also results in a decrease in the outsourcer’s profit
rate. The outsourcer thus has to trade off his desire to provide a high probability of
profit to the prospective vendor while still maintaining his own minimum profit rate.
The outsourcer’s actual profit rate for level k is (vk - ckE/(1 - D))/vk. If the
outsourcer’s minimum acceptable profit rate is T, then we have:
(vk - ckE/(1 - T))/vk > D

D < 1 - ckE/(vk(1 - T)).

However, since the maximum value ckE/(1 - θD) is ckU, then we also have the relation:
ckE/(1 - θD) <. ckU

D < 1 - ckE/ckU.

And D < Min{1 - ckE/( vk(1 - T)), 1 - ckE/ckU }
Since the outsourcer’s maximum possible profit rate occurs when the vendor
has no profit, then
T < (vk - ckE)/ vk

Thus by setting D = Min{1 - ckE/( vk(1 - θT)), 1 - ckE/ckU } and varying the values of
T, we can compute the corresponding probabilities of the vendor making a profit as

well as the corresponding expected vendor profit (i.e.,  DckE/(1 - D)) and outsourcer
profit.
Up to this point we have assumed that the payment that the outsourcer
makes to the vendor is fixed. But let D be the minimum acceptable profit rate for the
vendor and let D be the profit rate that will result in a γ probability of the vendor
making a profit. We assume that Dγ > D. Associated with these profit rates are
amount pkE = ckE/(1 - D) and pk = ckE/(1 - D ). If the vendor is paid pk by the
outsourcer, then the probability of the vendor making a profit is . However, if the
vendor is paid according to the following rule
pk = pkE

if

ck < ckE

pk = Min {ck + DpkE, pk }

if

ckE < ck < pk
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pk = pk

if

ck > p k

then the probability of the vendor realizing a profit is still

but the cost to the

outsourcer could be as low as pkE, and as high as pk . In fact the expected cost to
the outsourcer is less than pk . Under this rule the vendor earns the highest profit
when ck < ckE, with the minimum acceptable profit rate only guaranteed for ck < ckE,
even though the same absolute profit amount could be earned for some higher cost
values also. The vendor thus has an incentive to keep costs as low as possible.
Under our decision rule the vendor would again be paid in two parts pkA = pkE, and
pkB = pk - pkA, with pkA being paid during the contract and pkB being paid after the
actual cost has been determined.
Under this contractual scheme, the expected cost to the outsourcer E(pk) is
as follows:
E(pk) = pkET(ckE) + Min{ ((ckUpkγ2 - ckUckE2) - 2/3(pkγ3 - ckE3))/(ckU - ckM)(ckU - ckL)
+ DpkE( -T(ckE)), pk ( - T(ckE))} + pk (1 - )
and the outsourcer’s expected profit for performance level k is:
E( kO) = vk - E(pk) - s - (g + f)
Similarly, the vendor’s expected profit for performance level k is:
E( kD) = E(pk) - E(ck)
Given a minimum vendor rate of profit  D, and a desired probability of profitability
, the outsourcer would determine which performance level results in the highest
value of E( k).
VI. PROCEDURE AND CASE ILLUSTRATION
We will now present a two-phase process for implementing and using the
approach and models outlined above. Phase 1 is concerned with the business value
analysis. Phase 2 is concerned with analyzing the outsourcing situation, determining
the incentive scheme, and trade-off analysis. We outline the procedures for each
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phase of the analysis and present a case illustration to clarify specific issues for the
reader.
PHASE 1: BUSINESS VALUE ANALYSIS
The approach to defining the business value of IS outsourcing follows from
our discussion in section II. Here the manager is concerned with determining the
levels of performance that will be expected of the vendor, the value of each performance level to the outsourcer, and the cost of each performance. The procedure
for determining these is as follows:
Step 1.1: Define Performance Levels
(a)

Define the highest and lowest performance levels for the relevant IS function
that is to be outsourced. These definitions are from the perspective of the
outsourcer. Factors relevant to the definition of these levels include the
components of information quality (e.g., response time, accuracy of data,
ease of access, reliability) and end-user information processing costs. For
the numeric factors, it is likely that interval estimates rather than point
estimates will be used. For example, the response time of the highest level
may be defined as less than 30 seconds, while the response time of the
lowest performance level may be defined as greater than three minutes.

(b)

Define intermediate performance levels using the same factors as in 1.1(a).
These intermediate performance levels could be defined using any degree
of granularity that the outsourcer deems to be appropriate.

Step 1.2: Estimate the Value of Each Performance Level
(a)

Estimate the value of the highest and lowest performance levels. The
estimated values are the associated business benefits that result from the
corresponding information quality.

(b)

Estimate the value of the intermediate performance levels.
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Step 1.3: Estimate the Cost of Each Performance Level
For each performance level, estimate the highest, lowest, and most likely
cost. This is similar to the approach used in PERT for eliciting the time of each
activity. Some of the information relevant to the determination of these estimates
could be obtained from the bids of various vendors. The outsourcer could present
various performance level scenarios to prospective vendors and request estimates
of corresponding costs, as well as the additional vendor activities and IT resources
that would be needed to make the transition between different performance levels.
PHASE 2: OUTSOURCING OPTIONS ANALYSIS
In this phase, we demonstrate the main aspects of the outsourcing analysis.
This outsourcing analysis is conducted for two scenarios: (1) a fixed price incentive
contract, where the costs of information processing are certain, and (2) a variable
priced incentive contract, where the information processing costs are uncertain. The
procedure for implementing this phase is outlined below.
Step 2.1: Specify Vendor Profit Rate
The outsourcer specifies a value for the vendor’s profit rate θD that s/he
believes would be acceptable to the vendor.
Step 2.2: Generate Expected Profit Values
For each performance level, values for the outsourcer's expected profit and
the vendor's expected profit are automatically generated for various situations (e.g.,
Table 2 below with certain cost, Figures 4 and 5 below with uncertain cost).
Step 2.3: Trade-Off Analysis
Using the data generated in step 2.3, the outsourcer conducts a tradeoff
analysis to determine the performance level and vendor probability of profitability
that would be the most advantageous to the outsourcer and still sufficiently attractive
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to the vendor. The outsourcer may choose to do a focussed trade-off analysis for
a subset of the data and may choose to have this data displayed in a tabular form
(e.g., Table 4 below). At the end of this step, the outsourcer would have made at
least a tentative decision on the desired performance level, as well as vendor
probability of profitability for the scenario when vendor cost is uncertain.
Step 2.4: Specify Incentive Contract
The reward component, penalty component, and payment rules of the
incentive contract would be automatically generated based on the choice of
outsourcer in step 2.3.
It should be noted that steps 2.1 through 2.4 could be repeated for different
values of the vendor profit rate. Steps 2.3 through 2.4 also could be repeated
multiple times for the same value of the vendor profit rate.
The Case Examples
After years of dissatisfaction with poor returns on its expenditure for information processing, the management of MSM Corp. has concluded that it should
consider outsourcing most of these activities to an information processing services
vendor. Janet, the CEO of MSM, has instructed Joe, the MIS manager, to conduct
an analysis for the performance requirements, and determine an incentive scheme
as the basis for an indefinite multi-period outsourcing contract with a single vendor.
Specifically, Janet is interested in determining answers to the following questions:
What profit (cost savings) can be expected by outsourcing the information
processing activities? What price should be offered the vendor? What is the
probability that the vendor will shirk, and how would vendor shirking affect her profit?
What type of incentive scheme can be defined to induce the vendor to maintain a
performance level that is optimum for MSM business operations? After preliminary
discussions with IPS Corp., a reputable outsourcing vendor, Joe has a letter of
intent from IPS that they would consider a fixed or variable price incentive contract
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at a 20% profit margin (D = 0.20). Joe has determined that the basic cost to
establish the relationship, s, which includes legal fees, contracting, setup costs etc.,
would be around $1,464,844.00 and monitoring and coordination cost (g + f) for
each contract period would be in the area of $234,375.00. However, he has decided
to conduct a careful analysis to determine the effects of various levels of vendor
performance and their financial implications in order to specify appropriate incentive
schemes for both fixed and variable price contracts. Because of the nature of its
business, one of the primary performance requirements of MSM is simultaneous
reliable database access by 500 users, low response times (15 to 40 seconds) for
their transaction processing, and minimum service disruptions. In keeping with these
and other criteria, Joe has defined six levels of performance (K = 6): the most
desirable performance in which all the criteria are met to the least desirable in which
few of the criteria are met. He is certain of the costs ck of information processing and
is able to estimate values vk and pk the gross payments for each of the k performance levels that IPS delivers (see Table 1). These data will be used later to
compute the expected profit that MSM can expect and the incentives it might be
willing to pay for a given level of performance.
Table 1. Costs, Values and Gross Payment for
Various Levels of Performance
Performance
Level k

Value
vk

Vendor Cost
ck

Vendor Price
pk

Shirking
Level k

1

8,570,278.00 4,108,797.00

5,135,996.25

3

2

7,685,678.00 3,697,917.00

4,622,396.25

4

3

7,713,438.00 3,328,125.00

4,160,156.25

4

4

6,995,423.00 2,995,313.00

3,744,141.25

5

5

5,958,595.00 2,396,250.00

2,995,312.50

6

6

5,259,352.00 1,917,000.00

2,396,250.00

6

Journal of the Association for Information Systems

26

On analyzing the data in Table 1, Joe has determined that the best possible
profit that MSM can achieve from outsourcing its information processing to IPS is
Πo(σ3, p3) = $7,713,438.00 - $4,160,156.25 - $1,464,844.00 - $234,375.00 =
1,854,062.75. This return assumes that IPS does not shirk on performance of the
contract and receives a price, P3, of $4,160,156.25, from which IPS yields a profit,
ΠD(σ3, p3), of $832,031.30. However, since this is a single vendor situation and
there is no credible threat that MSM can conveniently switch to another vendor or
take its processing back in-house, we know that IPS can increase its profit by
shirking. Thus Joe must now determine the impact of any IPS shirking on MSM
profit. Upon further analysis, he finds that by shirking IPS can make a profit, D(
, p3), of (p3 - c4) = $1,164,843.25. All else being equal MSM’s profit will drop to o

4

(4, p3), which is $1,136,047.75. Thus the net increase in IPS’s profit is (c3 - c4) =
($3,328,117.00 - $2,995,313.00) = $332,812.00, and the net decrease in MSM's
profit is (v3 - v4) = ($7,713,438.00 - $6,995,423.00) = $718,015.00. Joe now
computes that MSM’s expected profit at performance level σ3 is E[

o

( 3, p3)] =

16640630 - h (7523438 - 6807423). But what is the likelihood that IPS will shirk?
Figure 2 graphically illustrates IPS’s potential for increasing its profit under various
probabilities of shirking.
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Figure 2. MSM’s Expected Profit for Various Levels
Performance by IPS
Now that it is clear that IPS is likely to shirk, the question that Joe must
answer is how to construct an appropriate incentive scheme that would induce IPS
to deliver the optimum performance required by MSM. In the simplest form the
incentive scheme could be (as described in Case 1, Incentive Scheme 1) to conduct
a post audit. If it is found that IPS has performed at the level kd instead of k, then
IPS would be required to pay MSM the sum (vk - vkd), which is the decrease in
MSM’s profit due to the underperformance. However, Joe thinks it will be difficult to
recoup any loses from IPS, and he decides on a “carrot and stick” strategy.
Consequently, he structures a payment scheme, which includes pre-audit and postaudit payments, and a penalty for underperformance. Using the techniques
described in Case 1, Incentive Scheme 2, Joe computes the pre-audit, post-audit
payments and the financial implications for MSM and IPS, for each performance
level with and without shirking (see Table 2). For example, we can see from Table 2
that MSM agrees to pay IPS $4,160,156.25, (pkA), for a level 1 performance and an
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additional amount of $975,840.00, (pkB), if an audit ascertains that IPS did perform
as per the contract. But if IPS shirks and does not deliver the agreed upon
performance, MSM deducts a penalty (pkB) from the post-audit payment. In the
case where IPS performs at level 3 instead of level 1, MSM assesses a penalty of
$856,840 and, therefore, pays IPS a post-audit payment of only $119,000.00, which
results in a deduction in IPS’s profit.
A fundamental question for Joe is: Would IPS consider entering such a
contract with an incentive scheme? Table 2 shows the amount of profit that IPS can
make by delivering various levels of performance for a given vendor profit rate. In
this case, it is the vendor profit rate that would provide a motivation for IPS to enter
into such a contract. Joe would, therefore, need to evaluate the effects of various
vendor profit rates on both IPS's profit and MSM’s profit.
WHEN INFORMATION PROCESSING COSTS ARE UNCERTAIN
Now the previous analysis assumed a fixed price incentive contract and that
the costs of information processing were certain. However, Joe has decided to
extend his analysis to include the condition of cost uncertainty. He has decided that
a variable priced incentive might be appropriate if IPS cannot precisely determine
the cost of the information processing activities. Using the estimates from Table 1,
Joe begins his analysis by estimating a range of costs for each level of performance
in which he is interested. As described above in Case 2: Variable Price Incentive
Controls, Joe assumes that the cost of processing ck, associated with each level of
performance k, is a random variable that follows a triangular distribution with
parameters ckL, ckM, and ckU.

He also assumes that the ranges follow the form

Min(ck) = ckL < ckM < ckU. = Max(ck); and that ckE, the expected value of ck, is equal to
(ckL + ckM + ckU)/3. Based on these assumptions, Joe generates the range of costs
for each level of performance (see Table 3). The question then is, given these
ranges for the cost of processing, what payment and incentive scheme is
appropriate?
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Table 2. Financial Implications of Various Levels of Under-Performance
Performance Level
Contracted

Payment

Outsourcer’s
Profit

Vendor’s
Profit

Penalty

Shirking

pkA

1

3

4,160,156.25

975,840.00

3,567,742.75

1,735,062.75

-24,808.75

1,027,199.25

856,840.00

2

4

3,744,141.25

878,255.00

2,932,572.75

1,364,062.75

58,573.25

924,479.25

690,255.00

3

4

3,744,141.25

416,015.00

2,988,092.75

1,854,062.75

30,813.25

832,031.25

718,015.00

4

5

2,995,313.00

748,828.25

3,337,719.00

1,552,062.75

-437,765.00

748,828.25

1,036,828.00

5

6

2,396,250.00

599,062.50

2,562,369.00

1,264,063.50

-219,993.00

599,062.50

699,243.00

6

6

2,396,250.00

0.00

1,163,883.00

1,163,883.00

479,250.00

479,250.00

0.00

pkB

With
Shirking

Without
Shirking

With
Shirking

Without
Shirking

Table 3. Ranges of Cost for Each Performance Level
Performance
Level k
1
2
3
4
5
6

vk
8,570,278.00
7,685,678.00
7,713,438.00
6,995,423.00
5,958,595.00
5,259,352.00

ckL
2,732,350.01
2,662,500.24
2,687,460.94
2,036,812.84
1,725,300.00
1,380,240.00

ckM
3,903,357.15
3,328,125.30
3,161,718.75
2,396,250.40
2,156,625.00
1,725,300.00

ckU
5,690,683.85
5,103,125.46
4,135,195.31
4,552,875.76
3,306,825.00
2,645,460.00

ckE
4,108,797.00
3,697,917.00
3,328,125.00
2,995,313.00
2,396,250.00
1,917,000.00

As we have shown above in Case 2, there is no guarantee that the vendor
can make a profit when the cost of information processing is uncertain. Further,
while a penalty for shirking may induce the vendor to perform at the agreed upon
level when costs are fixed and known, it cannot induce the vendor to accept (or
continue with) an unprofitable contract. Thus the question becomes, what incentive
can the vendor be given to enter into a VPI contract and perform at the expected
level? It follows then that the outsourcer must at least guarantee the vendor a high
probability of making an acceptable profit on the contract. It is not in MSM’s best
interest to guarantee the vendor a profit for the entire range of information
processing cost. Therefore, Joe is interested in determining the minimum probability
(γ) of profit that the IPS might find acceptable. From Case 2 above, Joe uses the
following relationships for this analysis:

D = Min{1 - ckE/(vk(1 -  T)), 1 - ckE/ckU }
Prob[ck < pk = ckE/(1 - D)] = 1 - (ckU - ckE /(1 - D))2/(ckU - ckM)(ckU - ckL) > 
Figure 3 shows the probability of IPS making a profit for some possible profit
rates of MSM. It is clear from this graph that IPS can make an acceptable profit.
As can be seen from Figure 3, as IPS’s probability of profitability increases,
there is a decrease in the MSM’s profit rate. Figure 4 displays, for each performance
level, IPS’s probability of profitability and the corresponding expected profit to MSM.
On the other side of the coin, Figure 5 displays IPS’s probability of profitability and
the corresponding expected profit. Now in defining the terms of the contract, Joe
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must trade off MSM’s desire for a high return and IPS’s interest in making an
acceptable profit.
What Should the Vendor Be Paid?
The final questions that Joe must now answer are:
(1)

What level of profit can IPS expect?

(2)

What is the level of certainty that IPS can make that profit?

(3)

What incentive would IPS have to perform at a specified level?

So far we have assumed that the payment that MSM makes to IPS is fixed. Since,
in this case, information processing costs are uncertain, Joe can only fix the profit
rate (D) that IPS will receive. He has decided to guarantee IPS a minimum profit
rate of 5%. Using the equation E( kD) = E(pk) - E(ck) discussed in Case 2 above,
Joe computes IPS’s expected profit for various levels of certainty, and for every level
of performance. Figure 5 shows the results.
1.10

Vendor's Probability of Profitability
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Figure 3. The Probability That IPS Will Make a Profit
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Figure 4. IPS's (Vendor) Probability of Profitability and
MSM’s (Outsourcer) Expected Profit
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Figure 5. IPS’s (Vendor) Expected Profit and Probability of Achieving It
Using the data behind both Figures 4 and 5, Joe generated for selected
values of IPS's (i.e. vendor's) probability of profitability, the corresponding expected
profit values for both MSM (i.e., outsourcer) and IPS (i.e., vendor). Table 4 displays
these values. Joe then used the values in Table 4 to analyze the trade-off between
MSM’s expected profit versus IPS’s expected profit in order to determine the
performance level and vendor probability of profitability that would be the most
advantageous to MSM while being sufficiently attractive to IPS.
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Table 4. Vendor’s Probability of Profitability and
Corresponding Expected Profits
Vendor's
Probability
of Profitability
0.75

Expected Profit
Party
Outsourcer
Vendor

0.80

Outsourcer
Vendor

0.85

Outsourcer
Vendor

0.90

Outsourcer
Vendor

0.95

Outsourcer
Vendor

0.99

Outsourcer
Vendor

Performance
Level 1

Performance
Level 2

Performance
Level 3

Performance
Level 4

Performance
Level 5

Performance
Level 6

2,447,865.57

2,017,061.43

2,493,214.90

2,048,329.12

1,687,206.61

1,502,397.49

314,396.43

271,480.57

192,879.10

252,561.88

175,919.39

140,735.51

2,410,284.91

1,983,090.73

2,464,252.30

2,013,107.11

1,665,193.60

1,484,787.08

351,977.09

305,451.27

221,841.70

287,783.89

197,932.40

158,345.92

2,376,027.80

1,952,126.69

2,438,881.05

1,981,213.69

1,645,128.90

1,468,735.32

386,234.20

336,415.31

247,212.95

319,677.31

217,997.10

174,397.68

2,345,661.44

1,924,681.75

2,420,474.81

1,953,201.83

1,627,344.58

1,454,507.86

416,600.56

363,860.25

265,619.19

347,689.17

235,781.42

188,625.14

2,320,215.51

1,901,685.51

2,404,762.59

1,930,058.84

1,612,443.02

1,442,586.61

442,046.49

386,856.49

281,331.41

370,832.16

250,682.98

200,546.39

2,305,283.28

1,888,186.89

2,395,346.53

1,916,773.87

1,603,695.91

1,435,588.93

456,978.72

400,355.11

290,747.47

384,117.13

259,430.09

207,544.07

Now, since IPS is guaranteed a fixed rate of profit, Joe decides that IPS
needs some kind of incentive policy that would induce IPS to perform at the agreed
upon level of performance. He decides that the incentive scheme should be based
on the following decision rule. IPS will be paid pk subject to the following constraints:
pk = pkE

if

ck < ckE;

pk = Min {ck + DpkE, pk}

if

ckE < ck < pk;

pk = pk 

if

ck > pkγ.

Under this incentive scheme, MSM will pay IPS in two installments, pkA = pkE
and pkB = pk - pkA, with pkA being paid during the contract and pkB being paid after the
actual cost has been determined. This policy ensures IPS a minimum level of profit
and MSM the lowest possible cost for the information processing. However, the
policy also provides an incentive for IPS to keep information processing costs as low
as possible. Under this incentive scheme, IPS earns the highest profit when ck < ckE,
with the minimum acceptable profit rate guaranteed for ck < ckE. Although IPS can
earn the same absolute profit amount for some higher cost values, IPS has an
incentive to keep costs as low as possible.
Would the Vendor be Inclined to Shirk?
ISP would be inclined to shirk only if there would be a resulting increase in
profit. Given that the penalty for shirking is Max {(vk - vkd), (ckU - ckdL)}, Table 5
displays the corresponding penalty amount for each contracted performance level.
From Figure 6, we see that in every case the vendor would have a reduction in profit
if he/she shirked, and so we can conclude that the vendor would not shirk. Similarly,
the outsourcer' s profit would increase if the vendor shirked.
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Difference in Vendor's Expected Profit: Shirking - No Shirking
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Figure 6. Vendor Profit with Shirking — Vendor Profit Without Shirking
Table 5. Penalty for Shirking
Contracted
Shirking
Performance Performance
Level k
Level k

(vk - vkd)

(ckU - ckdL)

Penalty

1

3

856,840.00

3,003,222.91

3,003,222.91

2

4

690,255.00

3,066,312.62

3,066,312.62

3

4

718,015.00

2,098,382.47

2,098,382.47

4

5

1,036,828.00

2,827,575.76

2,827,575.76

5

6

699,243.00

1,926,585.00

1,926,585.00
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V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In this paper, we presented an approach to analyzing key aspects of
information systems outsourcing decision-problems and constructing incentive
schemes for improving vendor performance, an area that is not well researched.
Building upon transaction cost theory concepts, we presented an approach to
modeling and analyzing key business value and vendor performance issues. We
presented a set of techniques for modeling incentive schemes when information
processing costs are fixed and known and when they are unknown. We demonstrated how the decision-maker can model incentive schemes to find the minimum
cost and maximum possible profit for the outsourcer. An important focus of our
model is on determining the probability of vendor shirking under different incentive
schemes and the cost of such shirking to the outsourcer. This type of analysis can
inform the outsourcer about the degree of risk he/she is likely to encounter with the
outsourcing contract. It also provides information that can be used to structure
incentive schemes to induce the vendor to achieve higher levels of performance.
Further, our model can assist the outsourcer in identifying conditions that can lead
to opportunistic bargaining by the vendor. Understanding these conditions can help
the outsourcer in crafting appropriate incentive contracts to combat shirking and
opportunistic bargaining. The model will enable decision-makers to conduct a more
comprehensive analysis of IS outsourcing decision problems. We would advise that
the models and analysis procedures illustrated above be implemented as a
spreadsheet application. Such an application would simplify implementation for the
manager and remove most of the burden of the computations.
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